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ABSTRACT
Orthodox international relations literature uses the word 
hegemony to describe a situation in which one nation state is able to 
dominate the global ordering of nation states due to its preponderance 
of material resources. By contrast Antonio Gramsci develops a theory of 
hegemony, frequently called "ideological hegemony," which situates 
the possibilities for hegemonic power in the ability of a dominant class 
to universalize its particular point of view. Although Gramsci applies 
the theory of hegemony to explain political power configurations 
within post World War I Italy, that theory provides a backdrop for a 
theory of hegemony in the intemationjfl arena. Not only does a 
Gramscian theory of international hegemony allows for an 
understanding of power which incorporates both material resources 
and belief systems, but also the Gramscian approach implies particular 
strategies for international politics with or without hegemonic power 
configurations.
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GRAMSCI AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Chapter I
Hegemony: From Political Realism to Historical Materialism
Expressed through a variety of guises orthodox international 
relations theorists use the word hegemony to mean the ability of one 
nation-state to dominate the international state system because of its 
preponderance of material resources. Robert O. Keohane expands the 
orthodox construct to incorporate the notion that mere material 
preponderance must be accompanied by an "ability and willingnes" to 
assert national power. Further, Robert Cox develops a theory of 
hegemony within the parameters of historical materialism. Below, the 
orthodox frameworks are outlined with an emphasis on hegemony as an 
expression of national power. By way of contrast and criticism both
Keohane's and Cox's contributions to an analysis of hegemony in the
international system are addressed. As the argument demonstrates, all 
schools involved consider hegemony to be a system-wide concept. 
However, the component parts of that international system are
constrained by theoretical building blocks. These approaches
converge where material resources are emphasized, but they differ 
where power is defined in more than material terms.
Like all frameworks for interpreting the world, international
relations theory is historically laden. One may argue that Neorealism
developed as a response to perceived weaknesses in older Realist
international relations thought. Archetypal spokesmen of the Realist
2
3camp would include E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. However, the ideas 
of Neorealism are fundamentally rooted in Realism. And, in a sense, 
Neorealism represents a micro adjustment to a well established Realist 
paradigm.
In a succinct passage of The Twenty Years Crisis E. H. Carr 
outlines the main tenets of the Realist approach. First, the process of 
history is understood as a sequence of cause and effect relationships 
that exist beyond, and cannot be changed by, mind processes . Second, 
practice creates theory, and not visa versa . And, third, "morality is the 
product of power" (1946/ 1964: 64). Carr's emphasis on the rea lp o litik
of power as the underlying historical reality, and motivating force in 
the historic process, remains central to the world view of modem 
Realists and Neorealists.
Although Carr presents Machiavelli as the "first important 
realist," the tradition of political Realism dates to antiquity. Frequently 
Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War is cited as a founding textual 
expression. In the orthodox texts one finds references to Thucydides--
e.g., that " The strong do what they can. The weak suffer what they 
must" (Thucydides, Book V, paragraph 90 [Chapter XVII, Modem Library 
ed. p. 311] ).* And, from the ancients to modernity the application of 
this tradition to international affairs rests its analysis on three 
assumptions that determine a point of entry to the world as well as 
possible outcomes in the international world. These assumptions may 
be summarized as follows (Keohane, 1986a: 7):
1. States (or city states) are the key units of action.
1 Cited (Keohane, 1986b: 177).
42. States seek power, either as an end in itself or as a 
means to other ends.
3. States behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, 
and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational 
terms.
In brief, Realism posits nation-states as primary actors in the 
international field. Such states behave with nearly universal 
rationality to maximize their power positions in the international 
arena. Here the maximization of power is a key attribute of 
international politics. As Carr states in The Twenty Years Crisis: "in the
international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality 
less" (1946: 168). 2 And, indeed, power is a key concern of historical
international relations theorists and practitioners. For instance in 
Politics Among Nations (1948/1967) Morgenthau portrays international 
politics as a struggle for power where agents of the nation state "think 
and act in terms of power"(1948/1967: 5).3
Realism applied to international affairs has emphasized the 
importance o f a balance of power within the nation-state system. In
Morgenthau's writings the balance of power becomes a key concept for 
understanding stability and change in the nation-state system.^ In one 
of the senses in which Morgenthau expresses the balance of power, it is 
a natural growth which follows from the reality of power politics and 
the struggle for power among nations (Keohane, 1986a: 13). However,
2 Cited (Keohane, 1986a: 8).
3 Cited (Keohane, 1986a: 10).
4 In Politics Among Nations balance of powers possesses two 
referents. First, it is a "universal concept" which refers to 
international power balance equilibriums (Keohane, 1986a: 13). And,
second, it is a "necessary outgrowth" of power politics and describes the 
situation of any power struggle (Keohane, 1986a: 13).
5within Morgenthau1 s own work the idea of power remains an elusive 
phenomenon. Keohane aptly points out that "his definition o f power 
was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource . .
. and power as the ability to influence others behavior" (1986a: 11).
Both Realists and Neorealists tend to view the international 
political arena in terms of a structural analysis. In a sense, rationally 
behaving nation-states seek power within the parameters of an over­
arching international system which is subject to structural constraints. 
This system simultaneously acts to constrain the possibilities of 
rationally behaving states and lays the field upon which interstate 
action occurs. Structure both limits and makes possible specific 
possibilities in international political struggles. It is this notion of an 
international system which leads Kenneth N. Waltz to comment that :
"The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for 
the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the 
millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent" (1986: 53).
In an effort to revamp and fine tune the Realist model Kenneth
N. Waltz has developed a theory of "structural realism." He describes the
nature of his systems theory, and systems theories in general, in the
following way:
[SJystems theories, whether political or economic, are 
theories that explain how the organization of the realm 
acts as a constraining and disposing force on the 
interacting units within it. Such theories tell us about the 
forces the units are subject to. From them, we can infer 
some things about the expected behavior and fate of the 
units: namely, how they will have to compete with and
adjust to one another if  they are to survive and flourish 
(1986: 60).
From the outset it should be noted that Waltz's structural realism 
examines the structure as a whole, leaving aside the internal attributes
6of the nation-states composing that structure (1986). He defines 
structure in three dimensions. First, the "ordering principle" of the 
international system is self-help within anarchy (1986: 81). Second,
"the character of the units," or nation states, is "like units" (1986: 87).
The similarity o f nation states in the international system is determined 
by the condition of international anarchy which precludes any 
hierarchial ordering of states. And, third, "the distribution of 
capabilities across units" in the international system is a balance-of- 
power (1986: 93). Waltz uses power as the determinate system variable :
"Power is is estimated by comparing the capabilities across units . . . .
The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a 
system-wide concept" (1986: 93). Like Morgenthau's classical Realism
which assumes rationally behaving states which seek power within
situation of power politics and an historical balance of power, Waltz's 
structural realism ends in a balance of power theory. As he clearly
states: "Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two,
requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be
populated by units wishing to survive" (1986: 121).
Another attempt to modify the Realist program while 
sim ultaneously m aintaining an emphasis on international structure is 
Koehane's Neorealism. Keohane's proposed model is a "modified 
structuralist research program, which relaxes some of the assumptions 
of Structural Realism but retains enough of the hard core to generate a
priori predictions on the basis of information about the international
environment" (1986b: 191). And, to encourage this project he calls for 
better theories of "domestic politics, decision making, and
communication" to "narrow the gap" between international and
domestic understandings of politics (1986b: 191).
Keohane emphasizes the importance o f understanding the 
"context of action before understanding the action i ts e lf  (i.e., 
structural analysis emphasizes the role of structure as both
constraining and creating possibilities for action), and he notes that 
structuralism adds a "irreplaceable co m p o n en t for a thorough analysis
of action" (1986b: 193). It is from this basis that he restructures the 
Realist research program. Re-examining the assumptions of Realism he 
calls for modification of all three assumptions. First, although states 
will be considered primary actors, the new program also includes
nonstate, intergovernm ental organizations, and transnational actors 
(1986b: 193). Each was ignored in the classical paradigm, but these 
organizations are real actors in the modern international arena.
Second, although a rationality assumption is granted to allow for a link 
between structure and behavior it will not assume "perfect information, 
consideration of all possible alternatives, or unchanging actor 
preferences" (1986b: 194).^ And, third, the assumption that "states seek 
power, and calculate their interests accordingly, would be qualified 
severely"(1986b: 194). Keohane contends that states do other things 
than attempt to maximize international power. In particular during 
situations of domestic crisis states may act to merely maintain
5 Koehane criticizes Realist constructs of rationality, at least in 
part, for their affinity for micro-economic understandings of 
rationality. He notes that "to say that governments act rationally in this 
sense means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that 
they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order 
to maximize their utility in light of both of those preferences and their 
perceptions of the nature of reality" (1986a: 11).
8sovereignty without attempting to maximize their global position 
(1986b: 194).
By challenging the limits of structural Realism Keohane hopes to 
broaden the focus of debate to bring Realist theory in closer proximity 
to "reality." Regarding the Realist power seeking assumption, not only 
does he reject claims that states always seek to maximize power, but also 
he rejects the claim that power is systemically fungible. Rather he 
assumes a differentiation of "power resources" to achieve differing 
goals: "[P] ower resources are differentially effective across issue areas,
and the usability of a given set of power resources depends upon the 
’policy-contingent frameworks’ within which it must be employed" 
(1986b: 194). His emphasis on "policy contingent frameworks" opens the 
possibility that beyond material structure "institutions" and "rules" 
ought be included in structural analysis (1986b: 194). Further, this
approach broadens the parameters of what may be included as a power 
resource. In the Realist paradigm power is a material asset. Power can 
be quantitatively measured (for the most part), and it is fungible. By 
contrast Keohane imposes organizational and issue area dimensions to 
determining national power.
Keohane’s Neorealism broadens the horizons o f Realist thought 
by incorporating a generation's worth o f research into economic 
reasoning, the development of multi-national corporations, the global 
recognition of international institutions, and the weight of case 
evidence. Nevertheless Keohane's approach is deeply embedded in the 
Realist tradition. Although the two schools part at certain points, they 
share common categorical assumptions. Keohane does not reject the
9Realist framework, he merely adjusts the assumptions to fit his
perception of "reality” more closely.
*  *  *
Above a framework for understanding the underlying premises 
of Realism and Neorealism was outlined. At this point I would like 
interject the notion of hegemony into the discussed literature. Put 
simply, hegemony, as it is used in the orthodox literature, refers to a 
condition under which one nation is able to achieve a position of 
international dominance because of its material preponderance. A look
at Gilpin's theory of hegemonic decline and war causation, and
Keohane's analysis of hegemony and cooperation in international 
political economy demonstrate the point sufficiently.
Within the orthodox camp Robert O. Keohane has argued that
across time the major concerns of international relations are "the 
sources of discord and of war and the conditions of of cooperation and 
peace" (1986a: 3). In particular his research focuses on the possibilities
for international cooperation. In After hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (1984) Keohane argues for the 
possibility o f cooperation in international political economy after the 
collapse of hegemonic regimes. As given he suggests that "even where 
where common interests exist cooperation often fails" (1984: 6). But he
does not address the problems of why common interests exist in the first 
place, or how they can be created. In this work common interests are 
assumed, and he consciously leaves out economic and ideological 
mechanisms which may generate the perception common interests. As 
he tells the reader: "I neither explore how economic conditions affect
patterns of interests, nor do I investigate the effects of ideas and ideals
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on state behavior" (1984: 6). It is from this perspective that he precedes
to argue that hegemony is not necessary for cooperation in the sphere
of international political economy.
Keohane's argument that cooperation is possible without
hegemony is, at least in part, a criticism of the orthodox "theory of
hegemonic stability." Put simply, the theory of hegemonic stability
defines the condition of international hegemony as one nation-state's
ability to maintain an order in the international arena because of that
dominant nation-state (hegemon) commands a preponderance of
material resources (Keohane, 1984: 12). :
The theory of hegemonic stability, as applied to the world 
political economy, defines hegemony as preponderance of
material resources. Four sets of resources are especially 
important. Hegemonic powers must have control over raw
m aterials, control over sources of capital, control over
markets, and competitive advantages in the production of 
highly valued goods (1984: 32).
Underlying the theory of hegemonic stability Keohane finds two
general propositions. First, hegemonic stability implies that "order in
world politics is typically created by a single dominant actor (1984: 31).
And, second, the theory suggests that the maintenance of a particular
world order requires a perpetual hegemon (1984: 31). Or, as
Kindleberger states: "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has
to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (1973: 305).^ Hegemony in
international politics depends upon one nation-state asserting its
m aterial preponderance. In a hegemonic international system the
rules of international behavior are enforced by the hegemonic nation-
6 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1973). Cited in (Keohane,
1984: 31)
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state over the whole nation-state system. Thus, hegemony is understood 
as the ability of one nation-state to dominate the system as a whole due 
to its material preponderance. If the dominant state, or hegemon, loses 
its superior command of material resources (perhaps symbolized by loss 
of a competitive edge in the global political economy) then the order it 
created and stability it exported are undermined.
Like Koehane's abstention from exploring the possible cultural 
and ideological sources of cooperation, this theory entirely ignores 
non-quantifiable variables in determining hegemonic power. The 
theory assumes a common understanding of which raw materials are 
valuable, power structures that enable one nation to control sources of
capital, and a common understanding of economic competitiveness.
Further, it leaves out any ideological conditions that would allow for this 
commonality of interests.
One application of the theory of hegemonic stability can be found 
in Gilpin's argument that war is likely under conditions of declining 
international hegemony. Using essentially Realist premises he argues
that "the distribution of power among states constitutes the principal
form of control in every international system"(1981: 29) J  Changes in
the international system are reflected in rising and declining nation­
state hegemony where "the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the 
beginning o f another cycle of growth expansion and eventual decline"
(1981: 210).8 He suggests that the sources of hegemonic decline are
rooted in economic processes that lead the formerly perponderent
7 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 177).
8 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 177).
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nation-state to lose its hegemonic position (1981: 115, 159).^ The result
of a nation-state's declining hegemonic position is a less than peaceful
transformation of the global political structure, or, in other words, a 
hegemonic war. Gilpin's use of a theory of hegemonic stability 
ultimately relies on a "basic force" model of international power 
(Keohane, 1986b). And his use of hegemony is easily reducible to the 
material force model Keohane identifies with the orthodox theory of 
hegem onic stability .
Dissatisfied with past expositions o f theory of hegemonic 
stability, Keohane tackles the problem of the formation and subsequent
collapse of the post World War II international monetary regime which
was formulated through the Bretton Woods Agreements. He finds the old 
theory of hegemonic stability utterly inadequate. Instead of finding 
that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system lead to an end of 
international cooperation, which the theory of hegemonic stability 
would predict, international cooperation continues in the post- 
hegemonic age. In particular he offers three criticisms of the model.
First, the model focuses only on tangible resources to calculate change 
and leaves out the role o f "confidence" in international affairs. Second,
the model ignores the possibility of a "dual" nature of power relations.
And, third, the model "overpredicts" the effects of a regime collapse 
(1984: 207).
Given these weaknesses in the theory o f hegemonic stability 
Keohane sets out to reformulate the model along the lines of his 
Neorealism. Unfortunately, Keohane's exposition of his own position is
9 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 178).
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foggier than his criticisms of the Realist model. 10 To Keohane
hegemony is a derivative concept which incorporates facets of political
Realism and Marxism. From the Realists he inherits the concept of
hegemony as a "preponderance of material resources" (1984: 32). To
this he adds Immanuel W allerstein's definition of economic hegemony:
a situation wherein the products of a given core state are 
produced so efficiently that they are by and large 
competitive even in the core areas, and therefore the 
given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a
maximally free world market (1980: 38).H
Keohane presents a sketch of Marxist understanding of hegemony based 
on a generic theory of Marxism which supposes that a Marxist critique 
of the world political economy begins with an analysis of class and 
uneven development within the capitalist global economy. He 
maintains that within the Marxist framework "theories of hegemony 
are necessarily partial, since they do not explain changes in the 
contradictions facing capitalism" (1984: 42).
Citing the influence of Marxists, Realists, and Institutionalists 
on his theory, Keohane provides a definition of hegemony that
10 Keohane’s analysis ultimately concerns the possibilities of
cooperation in the global political economy where cooperation is 
understood in contrast to discord. "[C]ooperation takes place when one 
policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its
partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result
of a process of policy coordination. . . (1984: 52). From the Realsit
appoach Keohane notes that cooperation is merely the logical extention
of a grand power struggle (1984: 7). From the Institutionalist
framework Keohane notes that ”[c]ooperation is essential in in a world 
of interdependence," and institutions foster cooperation (1984: 7).
1 1 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System II: 
Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economv. 
1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Cited in Keohane, 1984.
1 4
transcends the basic force model. Referring to work done by Keohane
and Nye he redefines hegemony in the following way:
Hegemony is defined as a situation in which 'one state is
powerful enough to maintain the essential rules
governing interstate relations and willing to do so'
(Keohane and Nye, 1977: 44).
This revised use of hegemony differs in two basic respects from the
Realist construct. First, unlike the theory of hegemonic stability
Keohane does not assume "an automatic link" between the possession of
power and leadership (1984: 34). Second, this revamped use of
hegemony not only emphasizes power, but also it considers the
"internal characteristics of the strong state" (1984: 35). In summary,
"[i]t does not assume that strength automatically creates incentives to
project one's power abroad. Domestic attitudes, political structures, and
decision making processes are also important" (1984: 35). By
reform ulating an understanding of hegemony, and the role this fosters
in international cooperation, he proposes a distinction between
hegemonic leadership and imperialism .
Successful hegemonic leadership itself depends on a 
certain asymmetrical cooperation. The hegemon plays a
distinctive role, providing its partners with with
leadership in tern for deference; but unlike imperial
power, it cannot make and enforce rules without a certain
degree of of consent from other sovereign states (1984:
46).
The emphasis on "asymmetrical cooperation" is essential to 
Keohane's point. Instead o f overtly dominating the affairs of other 
nations, the hegemonic power must cooperate with the subjects o f its
domination to the extent that the subjected nation is willing to "defer" 
power to the hegemon. Hegemonic rule is differentiated from 
imperialism because under the latter form of international power 
assertion the subjected nation is overtly dominated. By contrast
hegemonic rule implies conditions under which, for one reason or 
another, the dominant nation is "willing and able" to extract 
"deference" from the group of nation-states.
Keohane's reformulation of hegemony fits neatly into a "modified, 
research program." By relaxing the state as actor assumption he is able 
to include domestic structure. By relaxing the power seeking 
assumption he is able to assert that the possession of power does not 
necessarily lead to its articulation. And, by emphasizing the 
possibilities for cooperation he is able to set hegemony aside as a unique 
form of international domination. His refinements to the Realist use of 
hegemony separates out brute, or overt, domination from sophisticated, 
or sublime, control. In the former case one nation dominates the 
international arena because it has the material power to do so. In the 
latter case, mere possession of power is not enough, the powerful state 
must also possess sufficient intranational consensus and international 
deference to assert its power. Accepting Keohane's contributions 
towards a theory of international hegemony it is still useful to note the 
ability of one nation to make and maintain rules in the international 
arena is still rooted in material abundance. Although Keohane allows 
space for "willingness" and "deference," material abundance remains at 
the base of the theory. As I suggested earlier, Keohane's Neorealism is 
merely a micro adjustment to the Realist paradigm. His language and
concerns remain the same as ardent realists.
In addition to Realist and Neorealist theories of international 
hegemony, Robert Cox has developed a theory of hegemony in the 
international system that, in large part, is derived from Antonio 
Gramsci's ideological hegemony. Cox's approach is that of an historicist
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Marxist (Cox, 1986). Cox's contributions are extremely significant 
because he successfully bridges the concerns of orthodoxy and the 
insights of Gramsci's exploration of ideology as a power resource.
Cox's approach to understanding the workings of power in the 
international system is rooted in the tradition of historical materialism.
To Cox historical materialism is a form of Marxism which "reasons 
historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social 
relations" (1986: 214). He contrasts this mode of analysis with
"structural" Marxism which is essentially static in historical
perspective and focuses primarily on the capitalist mode of production.
Cox sees an analogy between Realism versus Neorealism as compared to 
historical materialism versus "structuralism." While both Realism and
historical materialism are rooted in historical modes of thought, there 
derivative spin-offs, structuralism and Neorealism, share an a- 
historical approaches and essentialist epistemologies (1986: 215).
Cox suggests that a historical materialist approach provides 
several useful insights for international analysis. First, historical 
materialism argues from the standpoint of dialectics. This affects the
theory at both "logical" and "real history" levels. At the level of "logic" 
the dialectic approach seeks to understand phenomenon through a 
method of dialogic contradicition—"a dialogue seeking truth through 
the exploration of contradictions" (Cox, 1986: 215). And, at the level of
"real history" the dialectic method explores the "potential for 
alternative forms of development arising from the confrontations of
opposed social forces in any concrete social formation" (Cox, 1986: 215).
With dialectical reasoning historical materialism approaches conflict 
through different lenses than either Realism or Neorealism. In both of
1 7
the latter approaches conflict is understood as either rooted in a fixed 
human nature (Morgenthau, 1948) or a recurring phenomenon in all 
international orders (Koehane, 1986a). The historical materialist 
approach roots conflict as part of a historical process through which 
human nature is reconstituted. Conflict both occurs in history with the
remaking of human nature and, concurrently, in "the creation of new 
patterns of social relations which change the rules o f the game out of 
which. . . new forms of conflict may be expected ultimately to arise"
(Cox, 1986: 215). The recurrence of conflict is historically rooted in
changing patterns of social relationships and a malleable human 
nature.
A second difference between Noerealism and and historical 
materialism is the latter's emphasis on imperialism as adding a 
"vertical" dimension to international power, or, in Marxist terms, the 
domination of the center over the periphery (Cox, 1986: 216). This
approach violates the Neorealist assumption that the international 
arena is contained by a situation of self-help anarchy. By contrast a 
historical m aterialist approach would postulate a hierarchy of states, 
and/or regions over other states and regions; thus, the theory allows 
for an emphasis on core-periphery tensions.
Third, historical materialism focuses upon the relationship 
between the state and civil society (Cox, 1986: 216). While the Realist
perspective views the State as the primary actor in international 
affairs, leaving out the internal attributes and ordering of the State, 
the historical materialist approach pays close attention to the 
interrelatedness, or lack there of, o f civil institutions—the degree of 
there development and articulation—and state power. Not only is the
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state as primary actor axiomatic in the Realist approach, but also, 
relationships within the state and interstate relations that are not 
articulated through state channels—such as dictums by the Holy Roman 
Catholic Church--are excluded from consideration.
And, fourth, historical materialism focuses on "the production 
process as a critical element in the explanation of the particular 
historical form taken by a state/society complex" (Cox, 1986: 216).
While the Neorealist, or Realist counterpart, argues from the 
perspective of the State, the historical materialist argues from the point 
of the cap ita lis t state. Within this tradition it is argued that the 
capitalist state is not a generic state. The capitalist state is particular 
state with particular interests that arise, at least in part, from the 
nature capitalist production techniques. Cox emphasizes: "Historical
m aterialism  examines the connections between power in production, 
power in the state, and power in international relations" (1986: 216).
By contrast in W altz’s structural realist model the dominant relations of 
production within a society are of a lower order than the state, and, 
consequently, these relationships are excluded from rigorous structural 
analysis.
Cox’s historical materialism utilizes a notion of "historical 
structures." These structures are "a picture of a particular 
configuration of forces" which "impose pressures and constraints" on 
human actions (Cox, 1986: 217). Three categories of force are of
interest in this model--"material capabilities," "ideas," and 
"institutions" (1986: 218). Put simply, material capabilities are the
"productive and destructive potentials" of a society (1986: 218). They
would include factors of production—land, labor, techniques of
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production—as well as tools of destruction. Ideas are both
intersubjective meanings, and cross-cultural "images" of a specific
historic structure (1986: 218). In this sense ideas are the sets of beliefs
shared within a group and across groups. For instance, the notion of
natural or human rights is shared both within many nation-states
(particular groups) across many national borders. And, institutions are
"the means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order" (1986:
219). This institutional component would include, but not be limited to,
state apparatuses, financial markets, educational systems, and religious
organizations. Regarding the relationship of these forces Cox states:
No one-way determinism need be assumed among these 
three; the relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal.
The question of which way the lines of force run is always 
a historical question to be answered by a study of the 
particular case (1986: 218).
Taken individually and collectively the elements of a historic
structure can be used to describe the level, or degree, of hegemony 
within a society. That is, one can distinguish between hegemonic and 
nonhegemonic social structures. Or as Cox states, "between those in 
which the power basis tends to recede into the background of 
consciousness, and those in which the management of power relations
is always in the forefront"(1986: 219). Although no single element of
the historic strucure causes the rise or decline of hegemonic power, the 
role of institutions is emphasized because it is through institutions that 
hegemonic power is articulated (Cox, 1986: 218).
Here hegemony is used in a sense which radically differs from 
Realist or Neorealist understandings. Cox has defined hegemony as "the 
temporary universalization in thought of a particular power structure, 
conceived not as domination but as the necessary order of nature" (1982:
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38). In this sense hegemony is not understood as material 
preponderance. Rather hegemony is the result of a particular power 
structure being legitimized to the point o f universality in the eyes of 
historic subjects.
Applying the notion of historic structure to the international 
context, Cox delimits three analogous forces. First, the relationship of 
the prevailing organization of production and social forces (1986: 220).
Second, the "forms of state" as understood from the perspective of 
historical materialism as civil society-state complexes (1986: 220). And,
third, "world orders," or "the particular configurations of forces which 
successively define problematic of war and peace for the ensemble of 
states" (1986: 220). It is at the level of world order that hegemonic
power configurations occur. But hegemony at the level of the system 
does not mean the domination of one state over other states merely 
through "aggressive military and economic policies" (1982: 45).
Hegemony at the system level requires that the social order articulated 
by the dominant nation appears as a natural global order. And, it should 
be noted that the global system does not necessarily possess hegemonic 
characteristics at all times. Global power structures can shift from 
hegemonic to nonhegemonic forms depending on the unity or disunity 
o f international forces. The hegemonic global order could be 
characterized by a globally dominant form of production and nation­
state civil society/state complexes which support the dominant mode of 
production. This would be the case for hegemony formed around a
"world order" based on nation-states.
In summary the conditions for a global hegemony would include:
1. a globally dominant mode of production;
2. a dominant state (or conceivably dominant group of 
states acting in concert);
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3. a normative and institutional component that lays down
general rules of behavior for states and the forces of civil 
society that act across state boundaries. . . (Cox, 1982: 45).
These conditions are prerequisite for global hegemony. It should be
remembered that Cox does not limit the concept of hegemony to the
global system. It is also possible to discuss hegemony in "the social
relations of production" and "social formation" (1982: 42-43). 12
Further, it is interesting to note that Cox’s preconditions for global
hegemony are not at odds with Keohane's infusion of "ability and
willingness" into the orthodox use. However, where Keohane extends
the basic force model to allow for the role of consent and deference, his
model does not articulate the necessary relationships o f mediation that
allow global domination to become hegemony. Keohane argues that the
possession of an abundance of material resources does not necessarily
translate into hegemony, and he does not specify the location of, or
relationship between, institutional forces and economic forces that
create a hegemonic global order. Cox’s argument for historical
structures offers a useful heuristic for grappling with the nature of
mediated power relationships.
Following the orthodox literature Cox argues that two historic
"global orders" based in hegemony within the nation-state system were 
pax britannica and pax am ericana. In each of these instances the
12 At the level of "relations of production" hegemony occurs 
where both the existing mode of production and relations of production 
support a power structure that appears as natural, or at least, necessary. 
And, at the level of "social formation" hegemony occurs where two 
conditions are met. First, the existence of a ” abroad coalition of classes
under the leadership o f one class that is able to make to make 
concessions adequate to maintain support, or acquiescence from 
subordinate classes in the coalition;" and, second, the existence of "a
state that acts to consolidate this class coalition and to promote the mode 
of social relations of production consistent with the continuing 
dominance of the leading class" (Cox, 1982: 43).
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global system was directed by a nation-state that was able to
universalize its conception of the world order. Under pax britannica
the working of the nation-state system were directed from the dominant
na tion -sta te  center.
In the mid-nineteenth century, Britian's world supremacy
was founded on its sea power, which remained free from 
challenge by a continental state as a result of Britian's
ability to play the role of balancer in a relatively fluid
balance of power in Europe. The norms of liberal 
economics . . . gained widespread acceptance with the 
spread of British prestige, providing a universalistic 
ideology which presented these norms as the harmony of 
interests. While there were no formal institutions, the 
ideological separation of economics from politics meant 
that the City could appear as administrator and regulator
according to these universal rules, with British sea power
remaining in the background as potential enforcer (1986: 
223).
The decline of British hegemony and the eventual ascendance of 
American hegemony witnessed not only a transformation o f which
particular nation articulated and supported a global order, but also that 
transformation witnessed a change in the very structure o f the world 
order.
The decline o f British hegemony may be viewed from the 
perspective o f changes in the interrelation of forces. In particular, the 
division of the world into ideologically opposed power blocks may have 
facilitated the rise o f American hegemony. By contrast to British 
hegemony, American hegemony was considerably more masked. That 
is, although America certainly possessed the economic and military 
might to enforce a particular world order in the post World War II era, 
the period between the late nineteenth century through world war II 
provided vast structural changes in the global economy and make up of 
nation-states that encouraged Europe and Japan to follow an American
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lead. Describing the hiddenness of American might during the p a x
am ericana  era Cox suggests:
The United States rarely needed to intervene directly in
support of specific national economic interests; by 
m aintaining the rules of an international economic order 
according to the revised liberalism of Bretton Woods, the 
strength of U.S. corporations involved in the pursuit of 
profits was sufficient to ensure continuing national 
power. The pax am ericana produced a greater number of 
formal international institutions than the earlier 
hegemony. The nineteenth century separation of
economic and politics had been blurred by the Great 
Depression and the rise of Keynesian doctrines. Since 
states now had a legitimate and necessary overt role in 
national economic management, it became necessary both
to m ultilateralize the administrative management o f the 
international economy and to give it an
intergovernmental quality (1896: 224).
While the former British hegemony had been relatively lacking in
international institutions, the post-world war II American hegemony
utilized international institutions to legitimize its view of a proper
global economic order. Further, the formation of this order was
facilitated by the perceived Soviet threat, the relative economic
deprivation of Europe after World War II, and growing economic
interdependence between nation-states.
Not only did the center of international power change hands
from Britian to the United States, but also the global order itself 
changed. On the one hand British hegemony depended on Britian's 
willingness and ability to articulate, export, and enforce through policy
a specifically liberal world view. On the other hand, American 
hegemony depended not only on the ability and willingness to export a 
world view, but also it required the formation of coalitions to enforce 
that view. The United States could not by itself, universalize its
perception of a natural world order. That perception of the proper
world order required the active consent of potential partners. One
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example of the give and take process occurring in the establishment of 
American hegemony is the talks between White and Keynes, spokesmen
for the United States and Britian respectively, at Bretton Woods. The 
program for a world economic order that emerged from the talks was 
neither pure White nor pure Keynes. Rather the Bretton Woods system 
reflects interest of both parties.
Cox's understanding of hegemony is a "particular fit between 
power, ideology, and institutions" (1986: 230). An assessment of the
orthodox theory of hegemonic stability would not assume recurring
cycles o f one nation-state forming and maintaining the rules of the 
international arena. Rather this approach would incorporate the idea 
of historical structure, and for any particular global order two
questions would be asked regarding hegemonic stability.
1. What are the mechanisms for maintaining hegemony 
in this particular historical structure?
2. What social forces and/or forms of state have been 
generated within it which could oppose and ultimately
bring about a transformation of the structure? (Cox, 1986:
230).
Although these questions provide only a rough set of guidelines for 
where to begin analyzing hegemony in the international system, they
do set the researcher on a divergent path from the orthodox approach.
By way of critique of the orthodox theory of hegemonic stability, Cox 
argues that the method of historical materialism calls for a 
reconsideration o f what is to be explained—the problematic itself. His
approach would call for an examination of the "relative stability of 
successive world orders" (1986: 222). And, his use of hegemony, as
contrasted with the orthodox use, would provide an alternative basis for 
understanding hegemonic world orders as stable world orders (1986:
223). In this case state power is not a given: it is part of what needs
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explanation. The explanation of why states become powerful is 
connected with the idea of an interplay between three levels of force at 
the national level and corresponding international forces.
With this model the orthodox problematic of explaining "the
sources of discord and war and the conditions of cooperation and of
peace" is transformed. *3 First, instead of studying recurring cycles of
hegemony within a relatively fixed understanding of historical
structure, the revised theory of hegemony allows for transformation of
the global structure (e.g., history is a succession of "global orders"
rather than one amorphous unchanging structure). And,
consequently, a condition of hegemony is not necessarily part of all
stable global orders. Second, since the model examines the levels o f
production techniques and class formations, understandings o f global
politics are not bound by state as actor assumptions. And, third, the
model suggests that nation-state centricity is historically bound. A
future (perhaps already emerging) global order may be based on
transnational class relations under the guidance of an international
"managerial class."
At the apex of an emerging global class structure is the 
transnational managerial class. Having its own ideology,
strategy and institutions of collective action, it is a class 
both in itself and for itself. Its focal points of organization, 
the Trilateral Commission, World Bank, IMF and OECD, 
develop both a framework of thought and guidelines for 
policies. From these points, class action penetrates
countries through a process of internationalization of the
state (Cox, 1986: 234).
13 In an introduction to Neorealism and its Critics Robert O. 
Keohane suggests that across history the sources of war and peace are 
the fundamental questions for international relations theory (1986: 3).
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Above I examined three approaches to understanding hegemony:
Realism, Neorealism, and historical materialism. The movement from 
orthodox international relations theory to Cox's historical m aterialism  
allows for a greatly enriched notion of global hegemony. The condition 
of international hegemony does not reflect the mere material 
preponderance of the state among nation-states. Instead hegemonic 
global orders reflect a recognized degree of uniformity in international 
production, and an institutional component which articulates and 
supports the dominant production techniques, exchange relations, and 
underlying belief system, or ideology, which supports these relations.
At minimum the break between the orthodox international relations 
theory and Cox's historical materialism represents a shift from studying 
the structural lim itations of nation-state behavior within a relatively 
static international system to studying changes in the production and 
exchange processes which create and transform particular global 
orders. However, despite this fundamental differences these 
approaches all share an emphasis on material manifestations o f power. 
Even in Cox's careful analysis of hegemony in the world order, the 
"positional picture" one arrives at is filtered through the production 
process. Cox's work goes a long way towards developing a multi­
dimensional model for understanding international power. However, 
much of his work has focused on the the level of the production process 
and relations o f production.
Chapter II 
Hegemony: a Gramscian Perspective
Since the 1971 publication of Antonio Gramsci's Selections From
Prison W ritings the theory of "ideological" hegemony has penetrated
scholastic as well as activist literature in the English speaking world.
Given the growing mass of Gramscian literature in English it should be
of no surprise that Gramscian theory has been assimilated into the
corpus o f international relations literature. Work by Robert Cox offers
provocative insights into the possibilities for expanding the
understanding of power in the international sphere by incorporating
Gramscian ideas. Borrowing from the wealth of Gramsci's ideas Cox
develops a theory of "hegemony and production." His presentation was
discussed in the first chapter of this essay. The explication of Gramsci's
theory of hegemony which follows is an attempted reexamination of
the meaning of, and possibilities for, hegemonic power in the
international world. In particular, I argue that Gramsci develops an
understanding of hegemony which is applicable at both the levels of
theory and practice. As a theory, Gramscian hegemony adds to an
understanding of how power is articulated in international politics. As
a strategy for global transformation the idea of hegemony is a central
concept, which pulls together broader programs for societal change. It
is not a plea for immediacy, or the catastrophic collapse of international
capitalism. Instead, Gramsci's theory of "praxis" (Marxism) calls for
27
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root criticism, careful planning, and gradual transformation. In light 
of the potentially genocidal powers of the modem nation-state system, 
these theory attributes should be amenable to everyone.
Writing in the wake of the Russian Revolution, World War I,
Italy's transition to capitalism, and the rise of Italian Fascism, Gramsci 
offers insights into the problems faced by revolutionaries of his age, 
and, perhaps most importantly, he develops fundamental criticisms of 
the revolutionary orthodoxy of his age—Marxism. Gramsci's approach 
to understanding the possibilities of social transformation differs 
markedly from his contemporaries of the Second International. His
approach takes the form of a ruthless critique of "economism," which is
the term Gramsci uses to describe various forms of reductionist 
Marxism. In particular, Gramsci's attack against reductionism takes the 
form of prison notes written against Bukarin's historical materialism.
Within the pale of Marxist thought the methodology of historical 
materialism has taken on a variety of meanings. In the first chapter of 
the present essay, Robert Cox's historical materialist method was 
addressed. Here I step back in history and outline a reading of the 
theory of historical materialism expressed in Karl Marx’s "Preface" to A,
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859/1968). The
paragraphs composing the 1859 "Preface" offer a doctrine which 
divides the human world into spheres of production and relations of 
production (economic base) and the legal, political, artistic, moral 
norms, and etc (ideological superstructure). In this theory changes in 
the ideological, or superstnictural, elements of society are social
responses to contradictions existing between the mode of production 
and the relations of production. One senses a one-way determinism in
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the theory as institutional and political changes are presented as
reflections of changes in the economic base.
In the social production of their life, men enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independent 
o f their will, relations of production which correspond to a 
definite stage of the development of their material 
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of 
roduction constitutes the economic structure of society, the
real foundations, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of 
social consciousness. . . .  It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their 
social being that determines their consciousness (1968: 
181).
In this doctrine it is understood that at certain conjunctural points in
history the superstructure "comes into conflict with" developments in
the economic base (Marx, 1968: 181). Changes in the economic base
cause a rapid transformation of the superstructure. And during this
process of change, or as Marx calls it, "epochal revolution,"
superstructural elements either decay or become historically
progressive. Thus, in times of revolution the one-way determinism of
production processes generating social consciousness gives way to the
possibility of a two-way causality. In other words, during periods of
societal transformation, changes in the economic base effect changes
in the superstructure, which in turn affect further changes in the
base. At these conjunctural periods consciousness becomes a
determ ining  factor.
In considering such transform ations a distinction should
always be made between the material transformation of 
the economic conditions of production, which can be 
determined with the precision of natural science, and the 
legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in
short ideological forms in which men become conscious of
this conflict and fight it out (1968: 182).
However in assessing revolutionary consciousness Marx insists that one
must explain it "from the the contradictions of material life, from the
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existing conflict between the social productive forces (mode of 
production) and the relations of production" (1968: 182). Although
ideology becomes a weapon, or tool, for revolutionary forces, ideology is 
intimately connected with contradictions in the economic base.
In light of the primacy o f the economic base Marx offers two
propositions that reemphasize the economically determined nature of
societal change.
No social order ever perishes before all the productive 
forces for which there is room in it for development have 
developed; and new higher relations of production never 
appear before the material conditions for their existence 
have matured in the room of the old society itself.
Therefore mankind always sets itself such tasks as it can 
solve. . . (1968: 182).
Underlying this theory is a teleological view of society. The
transform ation which Marx addresses here is the transform ation from
Capitalism to Socialism. And, in the history of mankind, socialist
transformation appears as a final human realization (1968: 182). Despite
the ability of superstructural elements to act as a force in themselves,
they cannot be a force for themselves. In the final analysis economic
structure determ ines, although dialectically, forms o f consciousness.
It was, at least in part, Marx’s emphasis on economic structure 
that propelled a wave of Marxist thinkers and practitioners to view 
social change in almost mechanical terms. In a generic sense, changes 
in the economic base exacerbate contradictions between economic 
structure and ideological superstructure. These contradictions come to a 
head in revolution through which the base and superstructure are 
reharmonized. However, such a generic formulation of historical 
materialism overlooks Marx’s claim that it is through ideological 
structures that "men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out"
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(1968: 182). We may use this general problem as a point of entry into
Gramsci's Marxiam.
By the conclusion of World War I, Marxism, as a theory and 
strategy for societal transformation, had entered a period of protracted 
crisis. It seemed as if capitalism was infinitely malleable, able to 
overcome periods of crisis and regenerate itself in new cancerous 
forms—especially fascism. The old Marxism which emphasized the
primacy of economic conditions failed to grasp the seemingly 
regenerative powers of capitalism. Within Marxist circles this problem
became a central concern. However the 1920's and 1930’s witnessed a
response to this weakness in the Marxist approach . New neo-Hegelian 
form of Marxism, articulated by Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci (to name a 
few), emphasized the need for better understandings o f proletariat 
consciousness (Boggs, 1984: 153). Carl Boggs notes that the new
Marxists "sought to demonstrate that the stabilization of capitalism could 
not be understood without looking closely at the unfolding of working 
class existence" (1984: 155). This examination of proletarian
consciousness calls for a reconsideration of the traditional formulation 
of Marxist analysis of levels of societal integration, or spheres of 
existence. As already discussed the old Marxism breaks society into 
spheres of base and superstructure. In this basic model of historical 
materialism society is formed at three levels—economic structure, civil 
society, and state. The economic structure is the base upon which civil 
society and the state are built. These latter superstructural societal 
elememts emerge as reflections of underlying economic relationships 
and technologies.
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Gramsci's critique of the basic model of historical materialism 
involves at least three movements. The first movement is a critique of 
"economism"--a euphemism for Bukarin's sociology in particular, and 
reductionistic Marxism in general. The second movement is a thorough 
revamping of "ideology." And, the third movement is reconsideration 
of the roles of the state and civil society in Marxist theory. By rejecting 
strict economic determinism as well as integrating civil society into the 
realm of determinate forces, Gramsci's Marxism calls for a thorough 
reexamination of not only our intellectual understandings of how 
society works, but also this approach redresses the role of activism in 
affecting social change.
Gramsci's critique of economism is spelled out most clearly in the 
essays "The Modem Prince" and "Problems in Marxism". Here he 
attacks past formulations of historical economism for utilizing 
essentially structural economic mechanisms to predict and understand 
social change. * In particular Gramsci sites three characteristic 
weaknesses of the approach. First, "in the search for historical 
connections it makes no distinction between what is 'relatively 
permanent' and what is a passing fluctuation. . . ." (1971: 163). He
attacks "historical economism" for failing to pay adequate attention to 
the complexity of economic class formations. Second, historical 
economism reduces economic development to the "course o f technical 
change in the instruments of work" (1971: 163). And, third, historical
economism proposes that both "economic and historical development
* Gramsci distinguishes between historical "economism"—crude 
reductionistic M arxism—and historical m aterialism —which is a more 
complex understanding of the interplay of material forces found in 
Marx's own writings.
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are made to depend directly on the changes in some important element
of production . . . which necessitate the new application of methods in
the construction and design of machines” (1971: 163). With each of
these ideas of historical economism Gramsci finds an array of problems.
Summing up the essentially weak position of historical economism
Gramsci proclaim s:
In its most widespread form as economistic superstition, 
the philosophy of praxis loses a great part of its capacity 
for cultural expansion among the top layer of intellectuals, 
however much it may gain among the popular masses and 
second-rate intellectuals. . . . They forget the thesis that 
which asserts that men become conscious of fundamental 
conflicts on the level of ideology is not psychological or 
moralistic in character, but structural and epistemological; 
and they form the habit of considering history as a 
continuous marche de dupes, a competition in conjuring 
and sleight of hand (1971: 164).
In this passage Gramsci highlights unwillingness o f economistic
Marxism to grapple with superstructural elem ents—especially politics—
and its consequent ignorance of the role of ideology in affecting
societal change. With economism politics becomes a "marche of dupes"
guided by illusions. By contrast, Gramsci suggests that although
economism has been presented as an "objective principle of
interpretation (objective scientific)," it too is a product of history (1971:
165). Against the objective laws of history proposed in economistic
Marxism Gramsci claims that all knowledge is rooted in history: all
knowledge is only understandable within a historic framework.
Regarding the economistic discovery of "regularity," "law," and "
'automatism' in history" Gramsci states:
It is not a question of 'discovering' a metaphysical law of 
'determinism', or even of establishing a 'general' law of 
causality. It is a question of bringing out how in historical 
evolution relatively permanent forces are constituted
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which operate with a certain regularity and automatism 
(1971: 412).
The notion of "bringing out" the historical interplay of "forces" in the 
historical process suggests that instead of rigid laws existing in an 
extra-historical sense, the very workings of interactive forces occurs 
within the plane of history. Another essential point here is the notion 
of "how in historical evolution relatively permanent forces are 
constituted . . . ." In the Gramscian force model economic forces are 
only one set of forces interacting with "political" and "military" forces. 
Again, Gramsci attempts to avoid reductionism, especially in the 
direction of economic determinism. One essential aspect of Gramsci's 
anti-reductionism is the invigoration of "ideology" within Marxism.
A second movement in Gramsci's Marxism consists of a
reworking of the role of ideology in Marxist analysis. Without doubt the
question of ideology may be considered a problematic within Marxist
frameworks. And, it is a problematic to which Gramsci was particularly
sensitive. In a section of the essay "The Study of Philosophy" Gramsci
outlines the economistic interpretation of ideology as "pure
appearance" which is "distinct from" underlying economic structures
and incapable of changing basic structural tendencies (1971: 376). By
contrast Gramsci's use of ideology suggest that ideological views of the
world are neither epiphenomenal nor false consciousness (Mouffe,
1979: 185). Instead ideology is the ground "on which men move,
acquire consciousness o f their position, [and] struggle" (1971: 377).
Gramsci reminds the reader that the study of ideology ought to begin
with Marx's 1859 "Preface."
The proposition contained in the "Prefacef"]. . . to the 
effect that men acquire consciousness of structural 
conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as
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an affirmation of epistemological and not simply 
psychological or moral value. From this, it follows that the 
theoretical-practical principle of hegemony has also
epistemological significance. . . . The realisation of a 
hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new 
ideological terrain, determines a reform in consciousness
and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a
philosophical fact (1971: 365-366)
By contrast to variations of Marxism which considered ideology
as an illusory mirror reflecting upon the real economic substructure,
Gramsci's Marxism attempts to remove ideology from the realm of
illusion. He defines ideology in a broad sense.
One might say "ideology" here, but on the condition that 
the word is used in the highest sense of the conception of 
the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in 
economic activity and all manifestations of individual and 
collective life (1971: 372).
W ithin this Gramscian analysis all world views are necessarily
ideological. Ideology consists of conceptions of the world found in all
social products. If all world-views are ideological then all forms of
consciousness contain ideology. And, it follows that if  all forms of
consciousness contain ideology then all forms of politics are essentially
ideological (Mouffe, 1979: 186). Thus, there is no way out of ideology.
However, Gramsci does distinguish between critically reflective and
uncritical, or unreflective, forms of ideology. With predictable
Gramscian wit, he calls uncritical ideologies, or ideologies of every day
life, "common sense," and critical historically based ideologies "good
sense." Beyond distinguishing between critical and uncritical world
views, Gramsci also discusses the degree of uniformity of ideology
within a social formation. Gramsci uses the notion of an "organic
ideology," or the ideologies "necessary to a given structure," to describe
the socially prevalent mode of thinking (1971: 376).
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Gramsci's insistence on the reality of ideology follows from his
general epistemological approach. As a heart felt Marxist, with slightly
Hegelian leanings, Gramsci views humanity as strictly a historical
product. In a letter from Prison to his wife, Gulia, he writes, "I . . . think
that man is formed completely by history, through coercion (though
this should not be understood only as external violence or brutality) and
I believe only that."^ However his view o f humanity as strictly a
historical product varies from economistic Marxism in as much as
humanity is understood as the the product of the "ensemble of
relations." That is the totality of human relations—not just economic
production relations. It is in this sense that Gramsci speaks of ideology
as a "material force"(1971: 165). Carl Boggs emphasizes this point in
The Two R evolutions:
For Gramsci, ideas, beliefs, cultural preferences, and even 
myths and superstitions possess a certain material reality 
of their own since in their power to inspire people towards 
action they interact with economic conditions, which 
otherwise would be nothing more than empty abstractions.
In other words, the contradictions of capitalist society do 
not 'explode' but are actualized and even manipulated by
human will power (1984: 158).
A third move in Gramsci's reformulation of Marxism is the 
categorical movement of civil society from the economic base to the 
superstructure. This movement necessitates a thorough reexamination 
of the superstructure as an integral and essential element in Marxism.
After all, in the Gramscian perspective, it is the institutions of civil 
society—the church, family structure, political parties, trade unions, 
the m edia—that articulate a world view that either supports or critically
challenges State apparatuses. A statement of Gramsci's reinterpretation
2 Letter to Gulia, December 1929. Cited in Davidson (1977: 248).
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of the placement of civil society in Marxist analysis can be found in the
essay "The Intellectuals."
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major 
superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil
society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly 
called "private", and that of "political society" or "the 
state". These two levels correspond on the on hand to the 
function of "hegemony" which the dominant group 
exercises throughout society and on the other hand that of 
"direct domination" or command exercised through 
through the State and juridical government (1971: 12).
Gramsci distinguishes between the overt domination at the level of the
State and the "hegemony" exercised by dominant groups through
mechanisms working at the level of civil society. More than
distinguishing between varieties of power articulated in
superstructural formations, Gramsci's inclusion of civil society as a
layer in the superstructure allows for the possibility of developing a
dialectic logic between the levels of superstructural power
relationships. In this approach civil society provides the "private"
basis for consent, and the State reinforces that consent with the force of
prisons and law. However, the notion that the private institutions of
civil society and the State can share the same interests supposes that
they share common world view. The formation of that common world
view is accounted for by Gramsci's theory of hegemony.
The theory o f hegemony found in Gramsci's writings appears to 
have passed through two phases. In the first phase Gramsci's use of 
hegemony is similar to the Leninist conception of a class alliance. In 
this sense one class acts in the interest of another class for political 
purposes (Mouffe and Laclau: 1985, Adamson: 1980). In the essay "The
Southern Question" Gramsci refers to an alliance between classes which
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is similar to the Leninist use of hegemony (Paggi, 1979; Mouffe, 1979).
Gramsci claims:
But the important thing to note here is that the 
fundamental concept of the Turin communists was not the
'magical formula' of dividing the big estates, but rather the 
political alliance between Northern workers and Southern 
peasants to oust the bourgeoise from State power (1978:
442).
The class alliance use of hegemony is incorporated into the 
second phase of Gramsci's theory. In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci
outlines a schematic understanding of hegemony as articulated through 
the dialectic of State and civil society relations. In the second use, 
hegemony refers not only to a unity of perceived interests, but also it 
refers to a unity of perceptions. Thus, hegemony refers simultaneously 
to class, moral, and intellectual alliances. In "Hegemony and Ideology 
in Gramsci" Mouffe remarks that hegemony "becomes the indissoluble
union of political leadership and intellectual and moral leadership,
which clearly goes beyond a class alliance" (1979: 179). This second
use suggests that hegemony is not overt domination by the ruling 
classes. Instead, hegemony is a universalization the dominant class' 
world views. Jacque Texier describes the world view of a hegemonic 
class in terms of internalization of regime norms: "[I]n all domains of
human activity—whether it be educational theory or politics--a type of 
conduct which is initially imposed by force, may subsequently be freely 
accepted by the subject himself. Discipline becomes self-discipline, 
coercion becomes self-government" (1979: 73).
One cannot overly stress the distinction between domination and 
hegemony in Gramsci's writings. Hegemony is a function o f a unity of 
world views articulated through civil institutions. By contrast 
domination is power asserted directly by State apparatuses. In one
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telling passage Gramsci states: "the general notion of the State includes 
elements which need to be referred back to civil society (in the sense 
that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other 
words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)" (1971: 263). On
the one hand the legal political society provides force, and , on the 
other hand, civil society provides the consensual basis for legitimizing 
State power. And, although hegemonic power presupposes the 
universalization of the dominant group's world view, the maintenance 
of hegemony requires a continuing limited consensual "give and take" 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. That is the dominant 
groups must take into account the interests of the dominated groups to 
maintain power. But the concessions the ruling group makes to the 
ruled groups can only be of a limited "economic-corporate" kind. 
Concessions that actually changed the real power position of the 
dominated groups would undermine the existing power of the dominant 
g ro u p .
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that 
account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the 
groups over which hegemony is exercised, and that a 
certain compromise equilibrium  should be formed--in 
other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices 
of an economic-corporate kind (Gramsci, 1971: 161).
Gramsci notes that such compromises cannot be of an "essential kind"
(1971: 161). That is, the "give and take" process between the dominant
group and the subordinate groups cannot sacrifice the basic interests of
the dominant group. The notion here is that a hegemonic power
configuration must be flexible enough to allow for minor "sacrifices"
by power holders to maintain the basic support of subordinate groups.
If such concessions are made within the confines of the hegemonic
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belief system—the values of the dominant groups—then ideological 
support for the dominant group is not undermined.
The process whereby the world view of the ruling groups 
becomes the universal world view involves an interplay of forces at 
three levels of society: production, civil society, and the State. Gramsci
explains the interrelation of these societal levels in terms o f "relations 
of force" existing in various "moments or levels." Like any ardent 
Marxist, Gramsci’s analysis of the relations of force begins with 
production. Thus, the first level of force is the relation of "social 
forces" which, "is closely linked to the structure, objective, independent 
of human will, and can be measured with the systems of the exact 
physical sciences" (1971: 180). These "social forces" represent the
cornerstone o f the economistic Marxism Gramsci criticizes at length.
And, although Gramsci sees even the physical sciences as rooted in 
history, they exist independent of "human will." That is "social forces" 
are part of an underlying objective reality. And, as in most Marxist 
analysis "social forces" exist at the level of the economic base.
The second level of forces in the Gramscian analysis are "political 
forces." Political forces represent the "evaluation of the degree of 
homogeneity, self-awareness, and organisation attained by the various 
social classes" (1971: 181). At this level of force the analysis enters the
superstructure. Here one should note that Gramsci locates political 
parties at the level of civil society, and, consequently, in the 
superstructure. In the Gramscian analysis political forces appear to be 
key in understanding the hegemony or lack thereof within a nation­
state. After all, Gramsci discusses political forces in terms of the 
"homogeneity," "self-awareness," and organization of social classes.
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Thus, it is through political channels that persons develop class 
consciousness and social solidarity.
The third level of forces which Gramsci discusses are military 
forces. Like political forces, military forces are located in the 
superstructure. But unlike political forces which are located in the 
sphere of civil society, military forces are located with the state 
apparatus. If, on the one hand, political forces in civil society generate 
social "self-awareness" and varying degrees of societal "homogeneity"-- 
the bases for social consent--, then, on the other hand, the State's 
control of military forces provide the tools to enforce the perceived 
societal consensus. Although the role of military forces appear less 
central in the Gramscian analysis than political forces, his analysis 
suggests that the "relation of military forces . . . [is] from time to time . . . 
directly decisive" (1971: 183).
"Social forces" are given by history and "military forces" are 
controlled by the State apparatus. In between these forces rest 
"political forces." It is with political forces that Gramsci attempts to 
explain the possibility for hegemony within a society. As mentioned 
above political forces represent the degree of "homogeneity" and "self- 
awareness" within a nation-state. Corresponding to three levels of 
force, Gramsci posits three levels of articulation of political force. The 
first level of political force is found in the relationships among 
members of a social class. Here members of one class identify with 
other members of the same class but feel no solidarity with the other 
social classes. Gramsci calls this level of political force the "economic- 
corporate" phase (1971: 181). He describes consciousness at this level in
the following way:
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The first and most elementary of these is the economic- 
corporate level: a tradesman feels ob lig ed  to stand by
another tradesman, a m anufacturer by another 
manufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel
solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the 
members of the professional group are conscious of its 
unity and homogeneity, and the need to organise it, but in 
the case of the wider social group this is not yet so (1971:
181).
The second moment of political consciousness occurs where the
sense of intraclass "obligation" gives way to a sensation of interclass
solidarity for members of all social classes. At this moment in the
development of class consciousness the sense of solidarity is still an
economic solidarity. But the realization of interclass generalized
solidarity allows for movement within a class towards achieving limited
political goals. In particular, subordinate classes may begin to seek
"juridical" or legal equality with the dominant class.
Already at this juncture the problem of the State is posed— 
but only in terms o f winning politico-juridical equality 
with the ruling groups: the right is claimed to participate
in legislation and administration, even to reform these—
but within the existing fundamental structures 
(Gramsci, 1971: 181).
Three points are worthy of note regarding the second phase of
political consciousness. First, Gramsci refers to this phase as a 
"juncture," hence, he is implying that this phase is transitional. It does
not reflect a permanent or, in Gramscian language, "organic" level of
political consciousness. Second, although procedural reform is possible 
at this level, such reform occurs within "existing fundamental 
structures." This suggests that the inclusion of subordinate classes in
the political process occurs on the turf o f the ruling class—using their 
legal code, their State mechanism. And, third, Gramsci notes that the 
"problem of the State is posed" at this level. Here the solidarity achieved 
within subordinate classes comes into contact with the State apparatus;
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hence, at this level one sees a link between developing class 
consciousness and the ability to confront the State, even where such 
conflict occurs within the State's "politico-legal" system.
The third level of political consciousness represents the
hegemonic moment of political consciousness. At this level the limits of
interclass economic solidarity is transcended by the "awarefness] that
one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development,
transcend the limits of the purely economic class and can and must
become the interests of other subordinate groups too" (1971: 181). At
this level of political class consciousness the entire set of interests of
various subordinate groups are fused into a set of common interests. It
is the formation of a complete set (e.g., not just economic interests) of
interclass common interests that rest as a precondition for hegemonic
power. More than a sense of transclass solidarity of interests the
notion of hegemonic political consciousness suggests a universalization
of perception o f interest.
[I]t is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies
become "party", comes into confrontation and conflict, 
until only one of them, or at least a single combination of 
them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to 
propagate itse lf throughout socie ty -b ring ing  about not 
only a unison of economic and political aims, but also 
intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions 
around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level 
but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the
hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of
subordinate social groups (Gramsci, 1971: 181-182).
In this passage Gramsci spells out the workings of hegemony at the
level of political consciousness. It is worthy of note that he emphasizes
a perception o f the attainment of a " 'universal' plane" for hegemonic
authority. The notion of universality implies that particular class
interests have been superseded by "universal" understanding of the
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world. Further, he remarks that hegemony is held by a " 'fundamental' 
social group over a series of subordinate groups."
The ability of a class to assert hegemonic authority depends on a 
combination of forces which make possible the supersession of 
"economic-corporative" interests by "universal" interests. The 
articulation of the dominant class’ interests as universal interests is 
made possible through the institutions of civil society. In a sense the 
education system, family structure, exchange norms, media, and (of 
special interest to Gramsci) political parties act as cultural mediation 
mechanisms between the dominant social class and the other groups it 
dominates. Thus, in the Gramscian perspective control of the 
institutions civil society becomes central to understanding State power.
It is through these institutions, especially political parties, that groups 
gain the knowledge and organizational structures that either maintain 
or challenge State power.
Gramsci's interest in the role of politics in general, and political
parties in particular, for affecting social transformation should not be
underestimated. His emphasis on the role of the relationship between
civil society and the state suggests that political activity channelled
through civil institutions offers a powerful point o f entry for
superstructu ral analysis.
The problem will therefore be that of establishing the 
dialectical position of political activity and of the 
corresponding science) as a particular level of 
superstructure. One might say, as a first approximation, 
that political activity is precisely the first moment or first 
level. . . (Gramsci, 1971: 137).
At the level of politics the role of political parties becomes a key concept
in Gramsci's work. After all it should be remembered that Gramsci was
not only a complex Marxist philosopher, but also he was an activist.
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Prior to being imprisoned by Mussolini Gramsci's life effort had been 
concentrated into the formation and running of the Italian Communist 
Party. As a party strategist, Gramsci recognized two distinct paths 
political parties might follow for attaining national power. The first 
path is that of a "war of position." The second path is a "war of 
manoeuvre." These two paths correspond to the relative development of 
civil institutions within the nation-state. The strategy of a "war of 
position" is applicable to the Western nations with well developed civil 
institutions with deeply embedded bourgeoise values. In these nations 
an open frontal assault against the State is impossible; thus, revolution 
is affected by means of a "tactical and informal penetration" of civil 
society (Adamson, 1980: 10).^ Adamson describes the logic of the "war
of position" as follows:
Such a revolution would be an extended campaign for 
hegemonic influence among the population at large; once 
this was attained, political power would be essentially at 
hand and many of the conditions of the socialism would 
already have been realized. In this sense, the tragectory 
of war of position can be plotted as a single unified 
movement spanning pre-dom ination, dom ination, and 
post-domination stages (1980: 225).
In the situation of highly developed civil institutions which support the
State, the other strategy, a "war of manoeuvre" becomes impossible. By
contrast to the "war of position" and its gradual infiltration and
subversion of of the old institutions of civil society, the "war of
3 Regarding the entrenched nature of the power structures in 
the industrial democracies Gramsci remarks: "The massive structures of
the modem democracies, both as state organizations and as complexes of 
association in civil society, constitute the art of politics as it were the 
'trenches' and their permament fortifications of the front in a war of 
position, they render merely 'partial' the element o f movement which 
before used to be the 'whole' of war, etc" (1971: 243).
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manoeuvre" represents a frontal assault on the State—a condition of 
overt warfare (Gramsci, 1971: 238-238; Adamson, 1980 : 225-228). This 
approach is suitable in countries with only partially developed civil 
institutions and a lack of value consensus between the State apparatus 
and the limited civil institutions (Adamson, 1980; Girling, 1982; Gramsci, 
1971: 243).
Throughout Gramsci's prison writings the notion o f hegemony 
recurs. It is both an analytical as well as strategic concept. Beyond 
strategic concerns, Gramscian hegemony suggests a unique 
understanding of power. It is an understanding of power which draws
on both subjective and objective conditions. Belief systems articulated 
and reified through the web of social relations not only support but also 
create understandings of power. These culturally centric 
understandings of power are expressed in terms of levels of hegemonic 
development within a society, and they are enforced with the legal and 
military apparatuses of the State. Together the economic substructure, 
civil society and the State form a "historic bloc"—"i.e., unity between 
nature and spirit (structure and superstructure) unity of opposites and 
distincts" (1971: 137).^ Again, it should be stressed that Gramsci
proposes that only a "fundamental class" can become hegemonic (1971:
161). Thus in the search for understanding the possibilities of
4 Gramsci also addresses the idea of "historic bloc" in the 
following way: "Structure and superstructure form an ’historic bloc.'
That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensem ble  of the 
superstructures is the reflection of the e n se m b le  of the social relations 
of production" (1971: 366). Further it is worthy of emphasis that
Gramsci uses the word "ensemble" to stress the multiplicity and 
complexity of varied social relations.
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hegemony within a nation-state, or even among the community o f 
nation-states, the possible forms of hegemony are limited. ^
Gramsci's discussions of the possibilities of a class becoming 
hegemonic are, for the most part, limited to nation-state examples. In 
particular he writes extensively about the possibilities of forming a 
potentially hegemonic communist party in Italy. The whole thrust of 
"The Modem Prince" is an examination of the history of Italian politics, 
the particular problems within Italy—e.g., the rise of Italian fascism 
and the lack of a "national popular will"—, and the development of a 
particular form of Italian Communist party capable o f not only creating 
class interests but also o f universalizing its ideology. Further in the 
essay "Americanism and Fordism" Gramsci writes of an emerging "cult 
of efficiency" in the United States where "Fordism" is perceived to have 
ushered in a whole new era of values, beliefs, and political strategies to 
facilitate "rationalised" production. However, there are other passages 
in Gramsci's writings that show quite clearly that he perceived the 
possibility of international hegemony. The possibilities for the 
formation o f an international hegemony are sketched, but not spelled 
out, in the Prison Notebooks.
Entering a discussion of international relations and Gramsci it is 
wise to reemphasize the distinction between Gramscian
5 It is essential to consider the problem that across nation-state 
d iffem t classes are fundam ental—e.g. m anagerial, capitalist, landlord,
peasant—according to the level of economic formation. What are the 
implications of this for forming an international hegemony. Cox 
argues that the transnational managerial class could become hegemonic
in a Western bloc (Cox, 1985), but could such a class universalize its 
point-of-view in agricultural economies? Here it seems that domination
is possible but not hegemony. Hegemony would require a unity of 
outlooks across cultures.
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hegemony,"ideological" hegemony, and other traditional uses of the 
word. As spelled out in the first chapter of this essay, traditional 
international relations theory uses the word hegemony to mean the 
ability o f one nation-state to dominate the international system due to 
its preponderance of material resources. These traditional theories 
examine interstate relations at the level of State interaction (State as 
actor assumption) as confined by an international structure. Such 
assumptions are incompatible with the Gramscian approach. First, 
Gramscian hegemony is generalized consent protected by the ability to 
use force. In the Gramscian approach hegemony is, by definition, a 
product of civil society. It is the institutions of civil society that 
articulate the dominant class' world view. Second, since hegemony 
resides at the level of civil society, any discussion of international 
politics that excludes the interworkings of a nation-state cannot discuss
Gramscian hegemony. To discuss Gramscian hegemony the "State as 
actor" assumption would have to be violated. Further, traditional 
analysis does not distinguish between State and civil society. One may 
recall that Gramsci ascribes the function of overt domination to the 
State, and he places the function of hegemony within civil society.
Thus, any discussion of "ideological" hegemony in international
relations requires that the "State as actor" assumption is either
abandoned or,at least, severely qualified. (In terms of qualifying the
"State as actor" assumption Robert Keohane's "modified research 
program" offers one possible starting point.) And, third, one essential 
aspect of Gramscian hegemony is the notion that understandings of 
power change with degrees o f hegemonic development and varieties of 
fully articulated hegemony. If one works from the position that
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understandings of power changes across time and through varied social 
formations, then the traditional assumption that "States seek power" 
becomes foggy. We can no longer impose the problems of the Athenian 
power directly onto modern social structures.
Given these grand incompatibilities between Gramsci's use of 
hegemony and the way hegemony has been used in traditional
literature, perhaps the clearest way of interjecting an understanding of 
"ideological" hegemony into international relations theory, is an 
examination of Gramsci's understanding of international politics. In 
contrast to orthodox approaches, especially Waltz's "structural realism," 
that view State action as constrained within an international system— 
an "outside-in" approach—Gramsci's analysis follows an "inside-out"
method.
Gramsci introduces the way in which one could develop a theory
of international hegemony in "The Modem Prince.” Here he draws on
the "relations of force" model and asserts that "[tjhese levels range from
the relations between international forces . . .  to the objective relations
within society. . ." (1971: 176). Although Gramsci does not define
international forces, he remarks that the discussion o f international
forces would include definitions of a "great power," remarks on the
"combination of States in a hegemonic system," and "the concept of
independence and sovereignty as far as small and medium powers are
concerned" (1971: 176). And, he raises the question: "Do international
relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations?"
(1971: 176). He answers this question in the following passage:
There can be no doubt that they [i.e., international 
relations] follow. Any organic innovation in the social
structure, through its technical-m ilitary expressions,
modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the
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international field too. Even the geographical position of a
national State does not precede but follows (logically) 
structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them
to a certain extent. . . . However, international relations 
react both passively and actively on political relations (of 
hegemony among the parties). The more the immediate
economic life of a nation is subordinated to international
relations, the more a particular party will come to
represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of 
preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand. . . (1971: 
176).
This passage is particularly insightful into Gramsci's perceptions of 
international relations. First, social changes of a "military-technical” 
expression occurring within a nation-state changes the relations 
among states. Thus, the "organic" or "relative" relations among states 
are effected by changes internal to a State. Second, the relationship 
between international relations and national politics is two-fold. On the 
one hand, the greater the degree of dependence between a national 
economy and the international economy, or a dominant sector in it, the 
more a political party is encouraged to "represent" this fact as a means 
of attaining power. And, on the other hand, by claiming to represent 
the international interests of the nation such a party represents "not so 
much the vital forces of its own country, as that countries 
subordination and economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations. . . 
"(1971: 177). The link drawn between national party politics and
international politics involves appeals to both the "popular will" of a
nation and the reality of that nation's "economic enslavement." The 
party seeking power utilizes the nation's international position to 
encourage mass support for itself, yet, simultaneously, the support 
generated by such a party fosters the interests of other dominant 
nations. This is the fashion in which Gramsci outlines the possibilities
for international hegemony. And, in a sense, he enters through an 
economic window.
In another section of the Prison Notebooks Gramsci discusses 
"Hegemony of Western culture over the Whole World" (in "Problems in 
Marxism"). Here Gramsci depicts the Western world as gaining 
worldwide ideological hegemony through the universalization o f a 
belief system which "culminated in Hegel and the critique of 
Hegeliansim" (1971: 416). He claims that both intellectuals and activists
have become absorbed in a cultural process that concludes with 
historical materialism and the "philosophy of praxis" [Marxism]. From 
these movements arose "a new way of conceiving the world. . . [which] 
tends. . . to become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely 
world-wide character, capable of modifying (even if  the result includes 
hybrid combinations) popular thought and mummified popular 
consciousness" (1971: 417). This modem consciousness which arose
from the popularization of German philosophy gives rise, as "the 
crowning point of all previous history," to thoroughly historical modes 
o f thinking—especially Marxism and humanism (1971: 417-418). ^
Perhaps Gramsci’s most telling passage in regards to his belief in 
the possibilities of international hegemony is found in "The Study of 
Philosophy." In a section entitled " ’Language', Languages and Common 
Sense" he tackles the problem of "educational doctrine and practice"
6 The degree to which Hegelianism, in one form or another, had 
permeated the "popular consciousness" of Western Europe in the 1920's 
remains an open question. Certainly among academic circles Hegel and 
his disciples had become well known. However, academics are only
one element of the civil complex which articulates hegemonic power. It
is doubtful that a Hegelian world view was assimilated into the belief 
systems of all social classes manipulating civil society in Gramsci's Italy.
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(1971: 350). He proposes that our understandings of education should go
well beyond "scholastic" concerns to the level of any social relation
where there are leaders and lead (1971: 350). He then suggests that
education is inherently encompassed within the workings of
hegem onic relations:
Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an 
educational relationship and occurs not only within a 
nation, between the various forces of which the nation is 
composed, but in their international and world-wide field, 
between complexes of national and continental 
civilisations (1971: 350).
Gramsci appears to be asserting that international ideological 
hegemony is not only a possibility, but also it is a real factor in 
international affairs. The notion of hegemonic relationships as 
educational relationships follows from position that hegemony is a 
situation o f  consent which is popularized through civil institutions. 
Throughout the above discussion on Gramscian hegemony it was 
stressed that hegemonic power is expressed through civil institutions.
At the level of the nation-state these institutions educate national 
populations. Moving to the level of international relations one can 
envision the civil society of one nation learning from the civil societies 
of other nations. From recent history one may consider: the 
transference of business management techniques form the United 
States to Japan and the Newly Industialized Nations; or the fusion of 
American jazz music into American rock-and-roll music which was
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then transported to Britian and the European Continent.^ Each of these 
m ovem ents represents in ternational phenom enon originating within 
the civil society of one nation which has grown to international 
proportion. In no sense did these movements stem from the juridical 
and legal apparatuses o f ’the State.
In the introduction to this chapter I suggested that Gramsci's 
exposition of hegemony differs radically from its use in orthodox 
international relations theory. Hopefully the above paragraphs have 
made this point clear enough. In the orthodox international relations 
literature hegemony means one nation's ability to maintain 
international order due to its material preponderance. In Gramsci's 
writings hegemony is "national-popular" consent which is articulated 
through civil institutions and protected by the state apparatus.
Although Gramsci speaks of hegemony primarily in the national 
context, he hints at international possibilities. The movement from the 
national level to the international level is, at best, problematic. (The 
possibilities for incorporating a Gramscian theory o f hegemony into 
International relations literature, and the lim itations of that inclusion, 
constitute the thrust of the final chapter of this essay.) Regardless of 
the problematic at hand, the Gramscian perspective is suggestive of an 
alternative model for understanding international power. First, this 
model would look inside the nation-state at the "relations of force"
7 The emphasis on education as the vehicle for transporting 
hegemonic belief systems between nations offers a provocative point- 
of-entry for both the activist and the analyst. For the analyist, the 
eduactional approach would begin with cross examination of "national- 
popular" beliefs articulated in different national civil institutions. For 
the activist, the notion o f gaining hegemony in the international 
system would begin with an infiltration of civil institutions that clearly 
possess transnational links. Here academia and the arts are possible 
starting places.
among the social spheres. Hegemony would be found within the nation­
state where the beliefs and values of the dominant class transcend class 
boundaries and appear universal in nature. Second, this model would 
examine the relations of force across nation-states. Here the analysis 
would focus on the homogeneity of practices, beliefs, and values in 
exchanges between nations. Third, the model would look for a tendency 
to wards,or away from, international hegemony in terms of the degree 
of development of an international "ethical-political" plane. Of course, 
this model would pay attention to economic and military capabilities of 
nation-states. After all hegemony is consent protected by the "armour
of coercion." Such a model of international power would, in a sense,
focus on the interplay of objective and subjective international forces. 
On the objective side one could count guns and butter. On the subjective 
side one could attempt to articulate an intercultural theory of belief 
components of power relationships.
I have also suggested that hegemony is not only an analytical 
concept, but also it implies a strategy. In this essay, I have not probed 
deeply into the strategic implications for the attainment o f hegemony. 
However such a strategy would include the conscious recognition of the 
following points: First, Gramsci emphasizes the role o f political parties
as key elements in the development of "counter hegemonic" belief 
systems. The way in which the party is structured and its membership 
are of great importance. Second, the attainment of hegemony within a 
State depends, at least in part, on the relative development of civil 
institutions. In some nations a frontal assualt—"war of manouevre"— is 
necessary. While in other countries the gradual transformation of 
"popular beliefs" through infiltration into the civil sphere—"war of
position"—is the only plausible path to hegemony. Third, hegemony is 
only attainable by a fundamental class. Fourth, the attainment of 
hegemony depends upon an alliance of forces; that is the attainment of 
a hegemonic position requires the consent of military, social, and 
political forces. And, fifth, Gramsci’s work provides only an outline. 
The details of strategy for attaining hegemony depend not only upon 
the development of civil society within the nation, or between nations, 
but also it depends upon the currently exiting levels of homogeneity of 
belief and value systems. In this sense, an Gramscian type strategy 
calls for very careful planning and analysis prior to action.
Chapter III
Hegemony: The Limitations and Possibilities for a Concept
W ithin the pale of orthodox international relations theory the 
word hegemony is used to describe one nation's ability to dominate the 
international system because of its abundance of material resources. By 
contrast the writings of Antonio Gramsci provide a theory of hegemony 
which locates hegemonic power within a dominant class' ability to 
universalize its point of view. Through the universalization of a belief 
system what may have appeared as domination appears as natural, or at 
least consensual, under hegemonic leadership. With Gramsci hegemony 
becomes a linking concept that not only allows for an explanation of 
the ability of capitalist social order to continually regenerate itself, but 
also the theory of ideological hegemony suggests certain strategies for 
action. As argued in the first two sections of this essay, there are points 
o f convergence as well as divergence between Gramsci's theory of 
ideological hegemony and other theories of hegemonic rule. Most 
importantly, Gramsci's emphasis on the potential power of ideas adds an 
irreplaceable elem ent o f subjectivity to political power relationships. 
However, the inclusion of ideas as a force in international politics may 
appear a naive idea to readers who look at the world through traditional 
international relations lenses. In the paragraphs that follow I outline 
some, but certainly not all, o f the problems and potentials for enriching
5 6
5 7
our understandings o f international power with a theory of ideological 
hegemony.
Turning to questions of strategy two problematics come to mind. 
First, what are the connections between Gramsci's ideological 
hegemony and more traditional theories of hegemony that could make 
Gramsic's work appealing to American international relations 
specialists? Given the axiomatic differences of Gramsci's "theory of 
praxis" and orthodox analysis the incorporation of a theory of 
ideological hegemony necessitates a willingness to suspend theory 
axioms. And, second, beyond academic considerations, what would the 
application of a theory of ideological hegemony strategically suggest 
for international actors. For both of these problems its is useful to 
think in terms of a "war of position." In Gramsci’s writings the term 
"war of position" is used to describe a strategy of a gradual infiltration 
into the institutions of civil society wherein an emergent "counter 
hegemonic" belief system may be articulated. Once expressed through 
civil institutions this "counter hegemonic" belief system may 
undermine support for the dominant belief system. At this level the 
"war of position" for changing the mainstream use of the word 
hegemony from domination to "consent protected by the armour of 
coercion" might begin, as does this essay, with an examination of the 
various ways hegemony has been used.
Examining literature on hegemony one is struck by two distinct 
uses of the word. The use of hegemony to mean a preponderance of 
material resources is little more than one way of defining domination.
In comparison to this use, hegemony also has a history on the political 
left which appears richer in content. In Hegemony and Socialist
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S trategy  Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe develop a "genealogy" of
hegemony which suggests that the the concept of hegemony develops
in response to gaps in historical models of power.
Even in its humble origins in Russian Social Democracy, 
where it is called upon to cover a limited area of political
effects, the concept of 'hegemony' already alludes to a kind
of c o n tin g e n t intervention required by the crisis or 
collapse of what would have been a 'normal' historical 
development. Later, with Leninism, it is a keystone in the 
new form of political calculation required by the
contingent 'concrete situations' in which class struggle
occurs in an age of imperialism. Finally, with Gramsci, the
term acquires a new type of centrality that transcends its 
tactical or strategic uses: 'hegemony' becomes a key
concept in understanding the very unity existing in a
concrete social formation" (1985: 7).
The understanding of hegemony as an organic concept
developing within a field of historical struggle inspires the American 
social critics Murray Bookchin (The Modem Crisis. 1986) and Carl Boggs 
(Social Movements and Political Power. 1986) to incorporate a Gramscian 
use of hegemony into their strategic analysis. Within these current
works by Bookchin and Boggs, not only is the word hegemony used to
describe the embedded nature of particular power configurations, but
also the word hegemony is used to describe the method by which social 
power can be transformed. In particular, both of these authors discuss 
the possibilities o f the development of a "counter hegemony" to 
confront existing power structures. In a similar vein Stanley
Aronowitz's The Crisis in Historical Materialism (1981) draws upon
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to explain the possibilities of 
incorporating "New Forces for Liberation," movements arising from
outside historical M arxism—feminism and ecology politics in particular- 
-, into a broader re-examination of the logic of capitalism (1981: 133-
135). And, work by John Hargreaves (Sport Power and Culture. 1986)
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utilizes Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explain the ways in which the 
English bourgeoise class uses sports to mitigate class tensions within 
Britian. Although this is only a partial list of current applications of 
Gramscian hegemony to social analysis, the point is clear enough: a
theory Gramsican hegemony has come of age to a variety of social 
critics.
Robert Cox's model of "hegemony and production," Richard K.
Ashly's model of "dialectical competence,"and Robert Keohane's 
N eorealist research program offer three examples in international 
relations theory where scholars have commenced an examination of 
G ram scian theory. * Cox's uses a theory hegemony to explain one set of 
links between institutions, forms of state, and production processes.
Koehane calls for an examination of domestic politics, and he 
emphasizes the importance of rules and institutions in international 
politics. Gramsci's theory of ideological hegemony shares a great deal 
with the "hegemony and production" approach. Like Keohane's 
Neorealism ideological hegemony emphasizes rules and institutions in 
international politics. Although I doubt that Keohane envisages his 
research as one moment in a war of position, his micro-adjustments to 
an established approach represent the type of positioning that may 
facilitate a closer look at institutions and rules in international affairs. 
Similarly, Cox and Ashly directly apply Gramsci in their international 
relations theories. It should be stressed that the articulation of an 
expanded theory of hegemony within international relations literature
1 Interestingly enough, Ashley's model o f "dialectic competence" 
incorporates Gramscian hegemony as well as specific nuances of 
G ram sci’s general theory—especially the role of "organic intellectuals"
(1986: 294-296).
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is only one moment of a process of reexamining understandings of
international politics. The theory of "ideological" hegemony is useful
not only because it provides a broader, and perhaps more "realistic," 
understanding of the logic of power, but also Gramscian hegemony 
suggests certain strategies for transforming global politics. This 
strategy begins with civil institu tions—including universities.
As suggested in the first chapter of this essay orthodox 
international relations theory begins with the following assumptions.
First, nation-states are the primary international actors. Second, such
nation-states act to maximize power. And, third, nation-states act with
nearly universal rationality. In the context of Waltz's "structural 
realism" the assumptions of international anarchy and nation-state self 
help are added.
A Gramscian analysis of international relations would diverge 
from the orthodox approach at several key points. First, although a
Gramscian analysis would consider the State as a primary unit in
international affairs, this approach would pay close attention to the
internal workings of the State, the degree of development of civil 
institutions, and the degree of alignment of the "relations of force."
Thus, the Gramscian approach seeks to expand the concept of the State. 
While the traditional models would exclude, or give only secondary 
consideration to, these intrastate factors, the Gramscian analysis would 
depend, at least in part, on understandings of relations within the state. 
Keohane's "modified research program" relaxes the "state as actor" 
assumption to allow for an examination of interstate and intrastate
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o rg a n iz a tio n s .2 Furthermore, the Gramscian analysis would emphasize 
the development of transnational institutions.
Second, the orthodox assumption of States as power seeking units 
has become widely contested in contemporary literature. Following a
movement in orthodox economic reasoning from the language of 
"utility maximization" to "utility satisfaction" the works of both Waltz 
and Keohane recognize that states do not necessarily at all times in 
history attempt to maximize global power (Waltz, 1986: 127; Keohane,
1986b: 194). Within the Gramscian perspective whether or not States
strive for maximal global power becomes a complex question involving 
the alignment o f forces within the state, the alignment of forces 
between states, and a particular understanding of power maximization- 
-hegemdnic or otherwise. Gramsci does not articulate a thorough 
theory of imperialism nor a complete model o f international relations;
hence, any remarks regarding Gramsci’s views on whether or not 
State's seek maximum global power are pure extrapolation.
And, third, a Gramscian analysis would reject any assumption of
universal "rationality" prior to analysis. Instead of viewing rationality 
as a given, "rational" behavior in international politics becomes part of
2 W altz's sympathetic critic, John Gerard Ruggie, contests the 
exclusion of all domestic considerations from structural analysis 
because the "functional scope of the international system will also vary, 
depending upon the the hegemonic form of state/society relations that 
prevails internationally at any given time. Therefore, the hegemonic 
form of state/society relations, or lack thereof, constitutes an attibute of 
the international system and can be used as a systems-level explanatory 
variable" (1986: 147). Ruggie’s use of hegemony in terms of
"state/society" relations incorporates, to some degree, a version of 
"ideological" hegemony. That is, while Ruggie does not want to violate a 
"state as actor" assumption, he recognizes that the capabilities of the 
actors in the international system change depending upon the degree 
o f consensus within the "state/society" complex.
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what needs to be explained. Universal rationality would be one 
possibility under a globally hegemonic social order. That is, his theory 
of ideology would allow for a universal ideology with a universal sense 
of rationality within a fully developed form of global "ideological" 
hegemony. Gramsci’s work points in the direction of a historically 
conditioned understanding of"rationality." Rationality does not exist 
prior to, or outside of, social relationships. Instead rationality, and 
rational behavior, derive meaning through a web of social
relationships. Since rationality exist within this web o f historical 
social relationships, the question o f what constitutes nation-state 
rational behavior must confront the ways in which historical subjects
perceive rationality.
Gramsci’s analysis of the relations of domestic forces within 
international politics, and his emphasis on the subjective elements of 
power, offer two helpful insights for further development of a theory 
of international relations. If, on the one hand, orthodox international 
relations theory has emphasized the role of material resources in
determining the relative power of a nation, then, on the other hand, the
Gramscian analysis understands national power in terms o f the 
interrelationship between subjective and objective forces. On the 
objective pole a Gramscian analysis would look at relative national 
power in terms of material resources—the quantifiable material 
resources emphasized in the orthodox approach. On the subjective side 
this model would examine the degree of alignment between ideological 
understandings o f the world within a society and the perception of a 
degree unity of world views across nation-states. The greater the 
degree of unity o f ideological perception within a society the closer that
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nation-state would be towards developing a national hegemonic social 
formation. The closer an ideology becomes to being universally 
accepted across the international system, the closer the international 
system approaches a hegemonic order. This approach would examine 
the degree o f homogeneity of world views across nations as articulated 
through the degree to which a nation-state's world view had been 
universalized throughout the nation-state system.
In the Gramscian approach the mere possession of a relative 
preponderance of "guns and butter" at the nation-state level (the 
objective forces of a nation) is insufficient to explain national power.
To explain the relative power of a nation-state this model would add 
subjective dimensions of power—the degree of ideological unity 
expressed through the social levels o f production, civil society, and the 
State. In turn, the degree of ideological unity within a State would 
depend, at least in part, on the degree of unity of the levels of force 
within the society. Instead of understanding nation-state power as a 
function of the quantifiable material resources possessed by the nation­
state, this model would account for these forces and then incorporate an 
analysis of subjective power variables. The understanding of national
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power arrived at through this model depends ultimately on the degree to 
which subjective and objective forces are unified.^
In the orthodox literature a theory of "hegemonic stability" is 
used to argue that where one nation-state is powerful enough to 
dominate the nation-state system cooperation is more likely. In this 
instance the possibilities for international order depend, at least in part, 
on one nation-state possessing enough material power to maintain a 
particular international order. Cox's analysis of global hegemony as a 
condition within the international system where "social forces," "forms
of state," and "world orders" exist with a high degree of unity offers an
alternative point o f entry for articulating a theory of hegemonic 
stability (Cox, 1986: 220-221). While the orthodox model of hegemonic
stability focuses on material power variables, Cox's approach examines 
the relationship between material forces ("social forces"), the 
organization of civil society and state complexes ("forms of state"), and 
the historic global "configuration of forces" ("global orders") (1986:
220). His model calls for an examination of the internal ordering of the
states composing the international nation-state system. However, he
does not emphasize the role of subjective forces to the extent that 
Gramsci does. Gramsci's emphasis on the degree of homogeneity of
3 Keohane's critique of the theory of hegemonic stability in A fte r
H eg em o n y  is one example of an attempt to include subjective
dimensions o f power. He states: "Hegemony is defined as 'a situation in
which one nation is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules 
governing interstate relations and willing to do so* (Keohane and Nye,
1977, p. 44). This interpretive framework retains an emphasis on power
but looks more seriously than the crude power theory at the internal 
characteristics of the stong state. It does not assume that strength 
automatically creates incentives to project one's power abroad.
Domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision making processes
are also important" (1984: 35).
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ideological perception, both within a nation-state and across the nation­
state system, provides a essential insight for theories of power. This is 
not to say that Gramsci's approach discounts the importance of material 
forces. Rather, material forces represent merely one layer of an 
expanded force model which includes "ideas" as articulated through 
civil institutions at both the national and international level.
If one approaches the question of the possibilities for developing 
hegemonic belief system through international civil society, then one 
encounters the problem that an international civil society exists with 
only weakly articulated institutions. Certainly, an international civil 
society is emerging. Its growth is fostered by the development of 
com m unications technology, m ultinational corporations, and 
international organizations such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. Nevertheless, one may question 
to what extent the development of international civil institutions has 
encouraged the development of an international "political ethical" 
plane. Within Gramsci's writings the ability of a class to universalize its 
world view largely depends upon the degree of development and 
support for the national civil society. Thus, international institutions 
would follow from highly developed national civil society. That is, the 
support for international institutions is predicated on the existence of a 
set of domestic civil institutions. For instance, Cox argues that a 
uniquely international class-- an international business m anagem ent 
class—is evolving through which the beliefs and values of a class can 
become universalized. Instead of rooting the possibilities for 
international hegemony with formal international institu tions, he 
emphasizes the development of an international class formation.
6 6
The application of an "ideological" theory of hegemony could 
enrich orthodox international relations analysis in several significant 
respects. Robert Cox's work provides an excellent starting point for 
developing a Gramscian theory of international hegemony. Cox's 
analysis filters hegemonic possibilities through the development of 
hegemony in the technology and relations of production (Cox, 1982). 
Institutions serve to enforce or undermine the compatibility of these 
relationships. As in Cox's analysis, the possibilities for "ideological" 
hegemony depend only in part on hegemony in production. Further 
determinate factors include the level of development of international 
civil institutions, and the relationship between military forces and 
these institutions. The ability o f an emergent international class to 
universalize its belief system requires a give and take bargaining 
position with the military capabilities of nation-states.
Since Gramsci’s use of hegemony emphasizes the subjective 
elements of power, this approach would require deep analysis into the 
interplay between international structure and and social consciousness. 
The extent to which social consciousness in general, and 
understandings of power in particular, depend upon the degree of 
developm ent and alignment o f international forces necessarily becomes 
a central concern. After all one aspect of a Gramscian analysis would 
include a demonstration that ideas are, at least in part, molded by 
institutional expressions. In particular the approach would call for 
analyses of the ideologies expressed within the existing international 
civil institutions.
This approach would suggest not only that international 
structure changes across time, as in Cox's model, but also it would impose
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a developmental understanding of international consciousness. Like 
social consciousness within the nation-state, international 
consciousness and international structures may pass through 
historically developm ental phases culm inating with an international 
"ethical political" plane. Here the notion of global structure would be 
used in Cox's sense of "world orders." In contrast to the Waltzain 
approach that views historical changes within the nation-state system 
existing within a relatively static structural container, the notion of 
"world orders" allows for the possibility that different historical periods 
actually possess different global structures. This is sense in which Cox 
discusses the difference between pax britianicia and pax am ericana.
The world order during these two periods differs not only in terms of 
which nations are dominant iri global politics, and the bi-polar or 
multi-polar character of global politics, but also these periods differ 
according to their "particular configuration of forces" (1986: 220).
Again, it should be stressed that although Cox’s work is useful for 
structuring a Gramscian analysis, it relies more heavily on the role of 
"social forces" than would a Gramscian model. Remarking on the 
materially driven nature of transformation of "world orders" Cox tells 
the reader: "Changes in the organization of production generate new
social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of 
states; and the generalization of changes in the structure o f states alters 
the problematic of world order" (1986: 220).
And, finally, the Gramscian approach would usher in a dualistic 
research approach for understanding international relations. On the 
one hand it would emphasize the identification of levels of force—the 
ways in which they are manifest and their degree of development—at
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both the national and international levels. On the one hand the 
analysis would examine the varying degrees to which ideological 
homogeneity is developed according to the alignment of forces at the 
national and international levels. Hegemonic global formations could be 
found where national forces are internally aligned with international 
forces under the veil of a dominant global ideology.
The application of a model of "ideological" hegemony to 
international affairs implies a greater degree of freedom for policy 
makers (at the international, national, and civil levels) to affect either 
political change or stability. Instead of being constrained by the 
current balance of powers, and relying on one nation's material 
preponderance, to assure relative global tranquility, the notion of 
ideological hegemony implies that "ideas are material forces," and, 
consequently, that peace can be fostered by the articulation of a world 
view that encourages cooperation. Although the inclusion of ideas as a 
force for understanding of international power was a central point in 
Carr’s critique of "idealism", one may argue that ideas do affect nation­
state behavior. Further, as compared to the global political situation 
surrounding Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis , one aught consider the 
relatively greater degree of international civil organization, the radical 
transform ation of communications technology resulting in an 
abundance o f information, and the transformation of global economic 
structures into a highly interdependent global economy as indicators 
which further the power of "ideas" in the current global situation.
Despite the actual transformation of the global economy, rapid 
growth in communications technologies, and the development o f a 
limited international civil society, at least two problems hinder the
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power of policy makers attempting to manipulate the international 
system through applications of a model of "ideological hegemony." In 
an analytic sense nation-states are autonomous. However the 
assumption of nation-state autonomy is countered by cultural and 
economic nation-state interdependence. Second, the model of 
"ideological" hegemony supposes a form of historical relativism. That 
the "ruling ideas in every age are the ideas of the ruling class"(Marx,
The German Ideology'} is an old adage that has fostered the interest of 
power holders, does not assure, in any sense, that future developments 
towards a global ideological hegemony will benefit poorer nations.
Under a global hegemonic power formation their oppression may 
become hidden behind the veil of the dominant ideology.^ Thus, 
although "ideological" hegemony suggests a greater role for politics in 
the international arena, those politics should be carefully scrutinized. 
Despite these limitations, the inclusion of a Gramscian model of 
hegemony into the corpus o f international relations literature does 
strengthen our understandings of the logic of power in international 
affairs—power is more than guns and butter. Not only does it suggest 
that ideas are a "force," but also it supposes ideology can be used as a 
tool to stabilize or transform social structure.
An acceptance o f a theory of "ideological" hegemony creates an 
expanded understanding of power at both the national and
4 Gramsci would, of course, contest this point and want to argue 
that the trend in history is towards a socialist world; that the 
development of counter-hegemonic belief systems will foster the 
interest o f the formerly dominated classes. If indeed hegemonic social 
structures are more than false consciousness, as one of Gramsci's 
French critics contends, if they due usher in their own systems of 
justice and morality, then how are we to differentiate between them?
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international level. Cox's theory of "hegemony in production" as well as 
Keohane’s emphasis on rules and institutions provide two examples of 
work pointing in this direction. Even where the theory of "ideological" 
hegemony is examined, understood, and not actively applied, that 
exercise involves a critical examination of the way in which words are 
used. Where the theory of "ideological" hegemony is actively applied it 
stresses the .possibility of political solutions to global problems.^
Strategically it calls for greater emphasis on the development of, and 
support for, international institutions. At present it seems unlikely that 
the dominant nation-states would be willing to transfer power from 
their national bases to international organizations. However, structural 
changes in the global economy may necessitate such a movement.
5 For relatively weak nation-states a strategy incorporating 
"ideological" hegemony suggests that it may be in their interest to 
actively support and participate in the institutions of the emerging 
global civil society. In a sense, relatively weak nations could engage in 
a "war of position"—a struggle for an institutional say-- with relatively 
stronger nations.
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